Quantifying the Preferential Direction of the Model Gradient in
  Adversarial Training With Projected Gradient Descent by Lanfredi, Ricardo Bigolin et al.
Quantifying the Preferential Direction of the Model
Gradient in Adversarial Training With Projected
Gradient Descent
Ricardo Bigolin Lanfredi
Scientific Computing and Imaging Institute
University of Utah
Salt Lake City UT 84112
ricbl@sci.utah.edu
Joyce D. Schroeder
Department of Radiology and Imaging Sciences
University of Utah
Salt Lake City UT 84112
joyce.schroeder@hsc.utah.edu
Tolga Tasdizen
Scientific Computing and Imaging Institute
University of Utah
Salt Lake City UT 84112
tolga@sci.utah.edu
Abstract
Adversarial training, especially projected gradient descent (PGD), has been the
most successful approach for improving robustness against adversarial attacks.
After adversarial training, gradients of models with respect to their inputs are
meaningful and interpretable by humans. However, the concept of interpretability is
not mathematically well established, making it difficult to evaluate it quantitatively.
We define interpretability as the alignment of the model gradient with the vector
pointing toward the closest point of the support of the other class. We propose
a method for measuring this alignment for binary classification problems, using
generative adversarial model training to produce the smallest residual needed to
change the class present in the image. We show that PGD-trained models are more
interpretable than the baseline according to our definition, and our metric presents
higher alignment values than a competing metric formulation. We also show that
enforcing this alignment increases the robustness of models without adversarial
training.
1 Introduction
Deep learning models have been shown to suffer from a lack of robustness against directed attacks
that produce only small perturbations to the original input [12]. Several attacks of varying strengths
have been proposed [36]. To solve the problem of lack of robustness, researchers have proposed
several methods for defending against such attacks [36]. These defenses include, for instance,
training using adversarial examples as samples [12, 26], preprocessing input data [13], regularizing
gradients [30, 25, 18, 15], and detecting adversarial attacks [3]. One of the most successful defenses
in terms of resisting new attacks [2, 4] is projected gradient descent (PGD) training [26]. When
applying this method, adversarial examples are found using iterative optimization with projection to
a constrained space after each iteration, and the resulting modified input is used for training.
PGD has been shown to make ∇L(x), the gradient of the loss function of a trained model with
respect to inputs x, more interpretable [33]. Other robust training techniques also induce interpretable
models [20, 8, 35, 21]. We focus our studies on PGD with an L∞ constraint due to its success and
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widespread use [26, 2, 4]. There is no single way of mathematically establishing the concept of
increased interpretability of∇L(x), and only a few quantitative studies have related gradient direction
to robustness. We propose a novel definition for this concept in binary classification datasets. We
formulate a gradient alignment α∆x for a given sample x as the cosine similarity between ∇L(x) and
a vector ∆x pointing from x to its closest point x′ in the support of the opposite class. We call the
direction of this vector as the interpretable direction. This definition is not the only way of defining
interpretability, but it is intuitively related to it.
We start by analyzing the robustness of models in a toy dataset where the data for each class lies
in one of two concentric spheres, inspired by the work of Gilmer et al. [10]. The dataset was used
by Gilmer et al. [10] to demonstrate that non-zero generalization error can be the only cause of
adversarial examples. We, nonetheless, use the dataset to prove a proportional relation between
robustness and the proposed alignment metric. The theorems used for this proof are generic for binary
classification problems, assuming local linearity and specific characteristics of the data distribution.
Since x′ is not straightforward to calculate for complex datasets, we also proposed a method to
calculate an approximation xˆ′. This method draws from the method visualization for regression with
a generative adversarial network (VR-GAN)[23], which uses generative adversarial training [11]
to train a generator to produce difference maps that, when added to an input sample, change its
associated label. We proceed to evaluate if the metric provides information for more complex datasets.
Our results show that the most robust model did not always match the model with closer alignment,
showing that the metric is not a direct representation of model robustness. However, we show that the
metric is informative, since, compared to a baseline, robust models trained with PGD have a larger
α∆x, and models trained using α∆x for enforcing a penalty on its gradient have higher robustness.
Furthermore, models show a closer alignment to the proposed metric than an existing alignment
metric proposed by Etmann et al. [8].
1.1 Related work
Etmann et al. [8] mathematically defined the alignment of gradients after robust training as the
alignment between the input image and the model gradient. Robustness is shown to be bounded by
the sum of the given metric with other terms related to gradients and internal bias weights. We argue
that this definition is not intuitive since an interpretable saliency map should not necessarily highlight
the whole input sample nor be directly proportional to the inputs. We compare the metric proposed
by Etmann et al. [8] against our metric and demonstrate that ours presents a closer alignment in
practice. In analyses of Ilyas et al. [16] and Tanay and Griffin [32], the gradient of robust models is
shown to be more aligned with the vector connecting the centroid of two classes than the gradients of
non-robust models. However, this finding is restricted to linear models. The complex boundaries of
piecewise linear deep learning models are unlikely to benefit from pointing in a single direction over
the entire support of classes in high-dimensional datasets. Using local information of projection to
the support of the opposite class, as we propose, is required to get flexible directions for each locally
linear region of the model, and, thus, for increasing local robustness.
For studying the alignment of gradients quantitatively, we introduce a metric and propose to demon-
strate its correlation with robustness. Other metrics with similar correlation properties have been
studied. The local linearity measure (LLM) [28], for which a low value represents high local linearity
of models around data points, is inversely correlated with the number of iterations in PGD. The metric
was not evaluated directly against robustness, despite its potential. The CLEVER metric [34] uses
an estimated extreme value for the Lipschitz constant of the model to calculate a lower bound for
robustness without having to perform evaluation attacks. This metric complements ours because it
does not evaluate the gradient direction, while ours does not evaluate the gradient magnitude.
We propose a penalty on the direction of ∇L(x). This proposal adds to the literature of gradient
penalties for robustness. Regularizing the Lipschitz constant of a model has repeatedly been shown
to increase its robustness [30, 25]. This regularization is equivalent to performing double backprop-
agation [7], i.e., to penalizing the norm of ∇L(x). This penalty, therefore, does not penalize the
direction of the gradient. Similar propositions have been made for multi-class setups [18, 15]. The
local linearity regularizer (LLR) [28] was proposed and combined with PGD to allow faster training.
This penalty is equivalent to enforcing the ∇L(x) vector to be constant around data samples, but the
penalty enforces no direction. An alignment penalty for∇L(x), aligning∇L(x) with x instead of ∆x,
was proposed by Etmann et al. [8], only as a future work. An analogous penalty was proposed by
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Chan et al. [6], using the same motivation of interpretable saliency maps being aligned with x, which
we argue is a non-intuitive constraint. The penalty enforces the gradient of the model to resemble
x through an adversarial loss. The alignment proposed by Noack et al. [27] enforces an L2 loss
on the difference between the gradient of the model and a saliency map of the non-robust model
generated through SmoothGrad [31], a visual attribution technique. No theoretical justification for
the generation of saliency maps through such a technique was given. The method proposed by Chan
et al. [5] transfers robustness from one model trained with PGD to other models by using the gradient
of the robust model as reference for an alignment penalty, enforced through an adversarial loss and an
L2 loss on the difference between gradients. This proposed penalty has no interpretability motivation
and is based only on the fact that gradient direction is one of the reasons for the robustness of models.
2 Approach
2.1 Motivation and formulation of alignment metric
The robustness of a binary decision model m at a specific point x can be defined as the distance of x
to the closest point where it is misclassified by m. Formally, we define
ρ(x) =
{
inf{‖δ‖p : m(x+ δ) 6= m(x)}, if m(x) = y
− inf{‖δ‖p : m(x+ δ) 6= m(x)}, if m(x) 6= y
, (1)
where ρ(x) is the robustness of m against adversarial attacks at point x, and y is the ground truth
class associated with x. We set a negative distance for misclassified examples to penalize errors and
prevent models with a trivial decision boundary, i.e, one that always assigns the same class, to have
infinite expected robustness. For this analysis, we will use the L2 norm, i.e., p = 2.
A closer examination of the Spheres dataset proposed by Gilmer et al. [10] can provide insights
into how to analyze the robustness of deep learning models against adversarial attacks. We describe
the motivation for our method using this dataset because its simplicity allows for a more accessible
analysis, while locally linear deep learning models can still partially fail in modeling it. We also use
this dataset to hypothesize about another aspect related to robustness: the association between the
robustness of a binary decision model and the alignment between its gradient with respect to its inputs
and interpretable directions. The Spheres dataset is composed of two classes with support on the
surface of two hyperspheres, of radius 1.0 and 1.3, one for each class, in a 500-dimensional space. The
prior probability for each class is 0.5, and the distribution of samples is uniform on each hypersphere
surface. We use the term support of a class c as defined by suppc = {x ∈ X | P (x|y = c) > 0},
where X is the domain of inputs.
For this dataset, the optimally robust model mp has its decision rule defined by
c =
{
1, if ‖x‖2 > t
0, if ‖x‖2 < t
, t = 1.15. (2)
This model has a margin of 0.15 between the decision boundary and any data point. Note that the
expected robustness Ex∼X [ρ(x)] is the same for all values of t, and the decision to choose t = 1.15
is based on classification margins. A differentiable decision model can be obtained by defining
mp(x) = σ(‖x‖2 − 1.15), where σ is the sigmoid function. This model has radial gradients with
respect to the input. This property is maintained, with a possible change to the opposite radial
direction, after applying a binary cross-entropy loss. We denote the gradient of the resulting loss L
with respect to inputs x as∇L(x). The gradients point toward the origin for class 1 and away from the
origin for class 0. We note that the optimally robust model has gradients that point from the support
of one class to the closest point x′ of the support of the other class. We denote the vector connecting
x to x′ as ∆x. We will proceed to theoretically justify the importance of ∆x.
Lemma 1. Let l(x) = sup{r : ∀v s.t. ‖x− v‖2 < r, ∃!w,∃!b s.t. m(v) = σ(〈v, w〉+ b)}, i.e. l(x)
is the radius of the largest hypersphere around x where a decision model m can be defined by a
specific linear decision function. Assuming that l(x) ≥ |ρ(x)| for m, then the logits of m can be
modeled as a linear function, i.e, 〈x,w〉 + b, for robustness assessment, resulting in a robustness
magnitude in x given by |ρ(x)| =
∣∣∣ 〈x,w〉+b‖w‖2 ∣∣∣.
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Lemma 1 follows from Lemma 1 in [8], where it is additionally shown that, empirically, despite
l(x) ≥ |ρ(x)| not holding, the linearization can be considered a good approximation. We will refer to
models satisfying the assumption in Lemma 1 as being locally linear around x.
Theorem 1. Let sim(u, v) be the alignment between vectors u and v, defined by their cosine similarity
sim(u, v) = 〈u,v〉‖u‖2‖v‖2 , and let m be a binary decision model. For a pair of examples x0 and x1
from a binary dataset, of class 0 and 1, respectively, and around which m is locally linear, the
combined robustness ρ(x0) + ρ(x1) of m is directly proportional to α according to ρ(x0) + ρ(x1) =
‖x1 − x0‖2 ×α, where α = sim(x1 − x0,∇L(x0)) = sim(x0 − x1,∇L(x1)) and L(xi) is the binary
cross-entropy loss for example xi.
Theorem 1 establishes that, given assumptions of local linearity, the sum of the robustness of two
inputs of opposite classes is proportional to the alignment between model gradient and a vector
connecting both inputs, and will be part of the Theorem 2. The proof for Theorem 1 is in Section C
in the Supplementary Material. We proceed to formulate a global metric to measure the robustness
of a given model trained for a binary dataset. Therefore, we define the robustness of a model as the
expected robustness with respect to the data distribution.
Theorem 2. Assuming that, for a separable binary dataset, it is possible to define a bijection between
the support of both classes supp0 and supp1 such that, given all bijection pairs (x0, x1), x0 ∈ supp0
and x1 ∈ supp1,
1. P (x0) = P (x1),
2. a binary decision model m is locally linear around x0 and x1,
then the expected robustness of m, ρm, is related to the average alignment α between the model
gradient with respect to inputs and ∆x of pairs (x0, x1), according to
ρm ≥ inf(K)× α
2
and α ≥ 2× ρm
sup(K)
, (3)
where K is the set of distances ‖x1 − x0‖2 over all pairs (x0, x1).
Theorem 2 sets bounds for the relationship between the expected robustness of a model and the
average alignment between the model’s gradient and vectors connecting inputs of opposite classes.
This theorem will be used to define (4) heuristically. The proof for Theorem 2 is given in Section C
in the Supplementary Material. The local linearity assumption of Theorem 2 is likely to hold only if
the bijection can be established between the closest points of both supports. Therefore, we define a
metric using the concept of alignment between∇L(x) and the vector pointing to the closest point of
the support of the other class, given by
α∆x =
∫
P (x)
〈∆x,∇L(x)〉
‖∆x‖2
∥∥∇L(x)∥∥2 dx,∆x = arginfr {‖r‖2 : (x+ r) ∈ suppj , x ∈ suppi, j 6= i}.
(4)
Given that assumptions from Theorem 2 are satisfied for the pairs of closest points between supports
of opposite classes of a dataset, the metric defined by (4) will be related to the expected robustness
ρm following α in (3). For the Spheres dataset, it is possible to establish a bijection as required
by Theorem 2 using points of opposite classes along the same radial direction. Since the prior
probability of both classes is balanced, and the probability distribution in both supports is uniform,
P (x0) = P (x1) holds for any pair of points. Thus, except for a possible violation of the local
linearity assumption, Theorem 2 holds for the Spheres dataset. Additionally, all distances between
closest points are constant, so both bounds can be combined into an equality ρm = ‖∆x‖2 × α∆x/2.
According to Theorem 2, the optimally robust model mp has ρmp = (0.3× 1)/2 = 0.15, which is
the expected value. However, the assumptions needed for applying Theorem 2 are unlikely to hold
exactly for more complex datasets. We perform empirical analysis to evaluate the alignments of such
datasets.
Interpretability It has been shown that, for models trained for adversarial robustness employing
PGD, the gradient of losses with respect to model inputs, also called saliency maps and represented
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Figure 1: Training diagram for learning to generate residual approximations ∆̂x for complex datasets.
The terms LDx0 , LDxˆ0 , and LG are classification losses, and LRegG penalizes the length of ∆̂x.
by ∇L(x), are more interpretable than for models trained with only supervised learning [33]. Etmann
et al. [8] studied the relationship between the robustness of a model and the orientation of ∇L(x).
However, the proposed alignment metric is measured between ∇L(x) and the model input x. In
terms of interpretability, this definition would mean that the whole image, locally modulated by pixel
intensity, is being used for the model’s decision. We argue that this definition is a rough approximation
of what interpretable alignment should be. For example, if trying to differentiate between images
of digits 3 and 5, only the upper part of the number should be used, since the bottom halves of both
digits are similar. If the alignment metric is calculated using our metric α∆x, only relevant parts of
the image will be highlighted, since the interpretable direction will be following the shortest distance
between both classes, omitting regions where no change is required.
Gradient penalty It has been shown that, in high-dimensional spaces, even models with extremely
low generalization error have adversarial regions in the original class supports [10]. This drawback
is due to the impracticality of optimizing a model using training examples covering the entire high-
dimensional space and causes the model to have regions with incorrect predictions. PGD training
partially solves this problem by finding nearby points in the input space that the model misclassifies
and using them as training examples. Another method to mitigate this problem is to enforce first-
order derivative directions on the loss, providing non-local information and reducing regions with
adversarial examples. Additionally, a penalty on the alignment of the gradient will reduce the odds of
the gradient pointing in random directions, potentially reducing meaningless changes to the input
when performing adversarial attacks. In other words, if∇L(x) is encouraged to point in the direction
of the opposite class, adversarial attacks will make more meaningful changes.
We propose that steering∇L(x) by adding a penalty Lα to a supervised classification loss will increase
the robustness of a model. This penalty is given by
Lα = −λαα∆x, (5)
where λα is a hyperparameter. This penalty is not meant to replace other robust training methods, but
to show that increasing alignment increases robustness.
2.2 Generating the alignment vector ground truth
For almost all real-world datasets, ∆x is not trivial to find. To generate it, we use generative
adversarial training [11] to characterize the support of two classes with a discriminator model D and
to train a conditional generator G to produce the residuals needed to convert from one class to another.
The formulation draws from the VR-GAN [23] method, modified to work with classification tasks
instead of regression tasks. Figure 1 shows the overall formulation for the training of the generator.
The main objective of this formulation is to find an approximation ∆x̂ for the residual ∆x pointing
from the original example x of class y to the closest point x′ in the support of the opposite class ¬y.
This residual is produced according to
xˆ′ = x+ ∆̂x = x+G(x,¬y). (6)
We set up an adversarial loss given by
LDx = E [L(D(x), y)] , LDxˆ′ = E [L(D(xˆ′), y)] , LG = E [L(D(xˆ′),¬y)] , (7)
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where L is a classification loss, binary cross-entropy in this particular case, LDx and LDxˆ′ are losses
for which D is optimized, and LG is a loss for which G is optimized. The generator G is trained
to fool D (LG), whereas D is trained not to be fooled (LDxˆ′). This adversarial setup, combined
with a traditional supervised loss (LDx), should make D accept only xˆ′ that are in the support of
class y. The loss LDxˆ′ should have a smaller weight than LDx so that, if G is generating perfect
modifications, D can still know what the support of y is. Finally, we define the term
LRegG =
∥∥∥∆̂x∥∥∥
2√
n
, (8)
where n is the dimensionality of x. This penalty is used to enforce that the modified image is the
closest point in the learned support of the other class. The final optimization is given by
G∗ = argmin
G
(λGLG + λRegGLRegG), D
∗ = argmin
D
(λDxLDx+, λDxˆ′LDxˆ′), (9)
where λG, λRegG, λDx, λDxˆ′ are hyperparameters.
2.3 Adversarial defense and attack
One way to make models more robust is to use adversarial training, which aims to find a robust
parameterized classifier m by optimizing
min
m
max
δ
L(m(x+ δ), y), ‖δ‖p < , (10)
where δ is a residual with a limited norm, L is a classification loss function, x is an input example
and y its associated ground truth. In PGD [26], the inner maximization is performed using iterative
optimization with gradient ascent with k steps of size η, and, usually, p =∞. The method can also
be used as a strong adversarial attack.
3 Experiments
We empirically analyzed1 if improving the robustness of a model using PGD training increased
its alignment α∆x, and if increasing α∆x by using the alignment penalty Lα improved the model
robustness. We compared both training methods against a baseline using plain supervised learning.
We also compared the values given by our metric α∆x against values given by the metric proposed by
Etmann et al. [8], to which we refer as αx. We adapted the metric, adding a normalization by ‖x‖2 to
change the range of values to [0, 1], to allow a comparison with α∆x. The metric was modified as
αx =
∫
P (x)
∣∣〈x,∇L(x)〉∣∣
‖x‖2
∥∥∇L(x)∥∥2 dx. (11)
All experiments were performed five times. We report the average resulting values and their standard
deviations. Section A of the Supplementary Material presents details about the experimental setup.
3.1 Datasets
We performed evaluations on four datasets, two of which were synthetic datasets for which we
could define the correct ∆x. For the Spheres dataset, defined in Section 2.1, samples were always
drawn randomly at runtime from a standard Gaussian distribution and normalized to the radius of the
respective class. The correct ∆x was calculated by
∆x =
{
0.3 x , if ‖x‖ = 1
−0.3 x1.3 , if ‖x‖ = 1.3
. (12)
We created another synthetic dataset, which we refer to as Squares, composed of images with
224× 224 pixels of centered large or small squares, with sides of 142 and 88 pixels, respectively. To
make the images unique, spatially smoothed Gaussian noise was randomly sampled for each image
1PyTorch code is available at https://github.com/ricbl/gradient-direction-of-robust-models
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Table 1: Examples of measures for generated ∆̂x for the Spheres datasets, for two random samples.
Class ‖x‖2
∥∥∥∆̂x∥∥∥
2
‖∆x‖2 ‖x̂′‖2 ‖x′‖2 sim(∆x, ∆̂x)
0 1.0 .307 .3 1.27 1.3 .858
1 1.3 .360 .3 0.99 1.0 .898
Class x ∆̂x ∆x x ∆̂x xˆ′ x ∆̂x
0
1
Figure 2: Results of the generated ∆̂x for random samples in the image datasets. The x′ column is
suppressed for the COPD dataset because of its resemblance to x.
and added to it. The correct gradient was calculated using the subtraction of a noiseless image of the
current square from a noiseless image of a square of the opposite class.
To check if the results hold for more complex datasets, we used the MNIST [24] dataset and a private
chest x-ray (CXR) dataset, which we will refer to as COPD. To change the MNIST dataset to a binary
class formulation, we used only two similar digits, 3 and 5. A fixed set of 10% of the training set
was used for validation, and the range, similarly to all other image datasets, was adjusted to [−1, 1].
The COPD dataset contained posterioranterior (PA) CXRs labeled for chronic obstructive pulmonary
disease (COPD) using pulmonary function tests (PFTs) [19]. For both datasets, the method presented
in Section 2.2 was used to estimate the correct gradient. More details about the datasets are given in
the Supplementary Material, and example images can be seen in Figure 2.
3.2 Validating gradient estimation
To validate the method for estimating ∆x, we applied it to both datasets for which we know the
correct ∆x and measured the alignment between ∆x and ∆x̂. We found that, for the Spheres dataset,
sim(∆x,∆x̂) = 0.874± 0.019, and, for the Squares dataset, sim(∆x,∆x̂) = 0.893± 0.058, which
demonstrates close alignment for both datasets. Table 1 shows examples of results for the Spheres
dataset. Figure 2 shows examples of generated ∆x̂ for all the image datasets. The generated ∆x̂
were similar to the expected ∆x for the Spheres and the Squares datasets. For the MNIST dataset,
the generated xˆ′ resembled digits of the opposite class and were almost ambiguous. This ambiguity
is expected when finding the closest point in the support of the opposite class. For the COPD
dataset, ∆x̂ had small norms, highlighting mainly areas around the diaphragms and the upper lungs.
Diaphragm shape and position are used as COPD evidence in CXR [9]. The small norms are likely
due to the continuous characteristic of disease severity, which leads to the support of both classes
being on the same manifold. Furthermore, most samples had PFT values close to the defined threshold
between classes. Consequently, most samples were probably close to the decision boundary.
3.3 Alignment and robustness
For the robustness metric, we report the estimated point 50% where 50% of test examples are being
classified incorrectly after applying PGD attack with varying values of . We report a single value
instead of the usual curve of accuracy as a function of  to have a more objective evaluation. We used
accuracy as the basis of the metric so that it is comparable to the style of reporting in the literature.
The defined 50%, used only for reporting, is equivalent to considering misclassified inputs to have
ρ(x) = 0 and calculating the median of the estimated robustness, which has been used to evaluate
the baseline metric αx [8]. In addition to using PGD with p =∞, we calculated the robustness of the
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Table 2: Results for robustness, alignments, and accuracy after training the models using a plain
supervised training baseline (B), alignment penalty (Lα), and adversarial training with PGD (P) for
4 datasets: Spheres (S), Squares (Q), MNIST-3/5 (M), COPD (C). Attacks employed to calculate
robustness include PGD [26], with two types of norms, and the black-box Square Attack [1] (BlBox).
Setup Accuracy(%)
50%
PGDp=∞
50%
PGDp=2
50%
BlBoxp=∞
α∆x
(ours) αx
S-B 99.4±0.8 0.0058±.0001 .099±.009 0.0063±.0004 .659±.028 .659±.028
S-Lα 100.±0.0 0.0076±.0002 .133±.001 0.0083±.0003 .886±.002 .886±.002
S-P 100.±0.0 0.0073±.0001 .126±.002 0.0080±.0001 .851±.001 .851±.001
Q-B 100.±0.0 0.031±.008 16.5±1.6 0.170±.041 .026±.007 .022±.006
Q-Lα 100.±0.0 0.435±.061 61.9±5.4 0.405±.001 .926±.004 .357±.009
Q-P 100.±0.0 0.501±.030 61.3±2.0 0.337±.011 .222±.042 .151±.051
M-B 99.3±0.4 0.198±.012 2.23±.01 0.232±.010 .171±.029 .013±.003
M-Lα 99.5±0.5 0.357±.011 3.88±.08 0.351±.009 .678±.078 .196±.010
M-P 99.5±0.2 0.547±.007 4.20±.15 0.495±.005 .345±.018 .040±.032
C-B 66.3±1.5 0.006±.0021 0.73±.33 0.021±.0063 .016±.005 .002±.0003
C-Lα 64.2±5.4 0.020±.0047 2.91±.65 0.028±.0074 .163±.009 .064±.019
C-P 64.7±2.7 0.063±.0294 4.97±2.4 0.072±.0324 .081±.007 .023±.013
models against L2-constrained PGD attacks, with an adapted step ηL2 = ηL∞ ×
√
n, where n is the
dimensionality of the data, and against Square Attack [1], an iterative black-box attack. Since the
Square Attack is formulated for images, we adapt it to the Spheres dataset by reshaping its 500-feature
vectors to a 20×25 image. We used the black-box attack to evaluate if any of the defenses were
causing gradient obfuscation [2]. For the MNIST and the COPD datasets, training with alignment
penalty as defined in (5) employed a different G for each run, and α∆x was calculated using one of
the other four trained G. Results for robustness and alignment are given in Table 2. The graphs of
accuracy as a function of perturbation norm are given in Section B in the Supplementary Material.
The alignment α∆x increased for all PGD-trained models when compared to baseline. Similarly, the
robustness of all models trained with the Lα penalty increased when compared to the baseline. These
results show that alignment and robustness are closely related, and one is a consequence of the other.
Theoretically, for the Spheres dataset, ρx/α∆x = 0.15 when p = 2. This value is close to the ratio of
values in Table 2, which lies between 0.148 and 0.151, experimentally validating the results from
the theoretical analysis. For the other datasets, even though the penalty alignment training had the
closest alignment, PGD had the highest robustness when p = ∞. PGD likely not only aligns the
gradient, but also improves robustness in other ways, such as providing a denser sampling of inputs,
especially in critical regions, and making the model more locally linear [28]. In Table 2, only models
trained using PGD exhibited signs gradient obfuscation, highlighted by the black-box attack being
considerably more potent than the PGD attack for some datasets. Section B in the Supplementary
Material provides an analysis of gradient obfuscation using the graphs of accuracy as a function of
perturbation norm.
Except for the Spheres dataset, where our proposed alignment metrics α∆x mathematically reduces
to the alignment metric αx [8], our metric α∆x was larger than αx in all cases, demonstrating that
robust models are more closely aligned with ∆x than with x. In some cases, neither metric had its
highest value for the most robust model. It is also worth noting that α∆x employs the direction to
which the gradient is pointing, providing more information than the αx metric, which has an absolute
value in its numerator.
Figure 3 shows∇L(x) for random images in each dataset for all three training methods. The saliency
maps are noisier for the baseline and smoother for models trained with Lα, whereas PGD-trained
models have an intermediate amount of noise and are more localized. These observations confirm
that robust models provide more meaningful saliency maps, in comparison to the baseline.
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Figure 3: Examples of the saliency map ∇L(x) for all the training methods. Bottom right: details of
the saliency maps for the COPD dataset for the region defined by the red square.
4 Conclusion and future work
We proposed a novel method for measuring alignment between the gradient of robust models and
interpretable directions by using the concept of cosine similarity between gradient and the vector
pointing to the closest example of the support of the opposite class. We validated the proposed
metric theoretically and showed experimentally that alignment increases with PGD training and that
robustness increases with alignment enforcement. Trained models also showed a closer alignment
with the proposed metric than with another metric definition. The metric was not directly predictive
of robustness since models with the strongest alignment were not always the most robust. This
finding is possibly a result of the violation of the strong assumptions of the theoretical analysis. It
also highlights the possibility of PGD increasing robustness by means other than gradient alignment.
Finally, we expand our fundamental understanding of adversarial defenses, benefiting future analyses
of model robustness.
One possible future line of work is the study of feasibility of applying the proposed techniques
to multi-class tasks. This work will require tackling the practical obstacles due to the increased
complexity in the generative part of the technique. Combining the proposed method with PGD and
with LLR is another direction for future work.
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Supplementary Material
A Experimental setup and dataset details
Table 3: Details about datasets and training setup
Dataset/Properties&Hyperparameters Spheres Squares MNIST COPD
Train set size 10,000,000/epoch 10,000 10,397 3,711
Validation set size 200 200 1,155 596
Test set size 1,000 1,000 1,902 950
Data dimensionality 500 224×224 28×28 224×224
% of samples of class 0 - training set ∼50% 49.7% 53.1% 63%
% of samples of class 0 - validation set ∼50% 53.0% 53.1% 49.8%
% of samples of class 0 - test set ∼50% 49.5% 53.1% 58.2%
PGD -  for training 0.005 0.2 0.3 0.006
PGD - η 0.002 0.02 0.02 0.02
# epochs 80 30 30 30
λα 0.1 0.1 0.1 10
Batch size 50 12 12 12
Average training time - baseline (hours) 2.3 1.3 4.1 3.7
Average training time - G (hours) 3 0.8 0.1 1
Average training time - Lα (hours) 6.2 1.5 3.7 4.2
Average training time - PGD (hours) 15.4 2.5 3.1 4.9
Average test time - Square Attack (hours) 0.3 6.3 8.8 3.8
For the Spheres dataset, we used a 2-hidden layer network, with 1000 neurons per layer, batch
normalization [17], and ReLU non-linearity, varying the output of the last layer to 500 for the
generator and 1 for the classifiers. For all other datasets, we used a Resnet-18 [14] as the classifier
and U-net [29] as the generator. In the U-net, we utilized two levels of downsampling for MNIST
and four levels of downsampling for Squares and COPD. The values of ¬y and y were concatenated
as channels to the U-net’s bottleneck. PGD attacks, for training and validation, used k = 40. The
Square Attack was used with 5000 queries per attack and 80% as an initial percentage of features to
be modified. We used the Adam optimizer [22] with a learning rate of 10−4. For training G, we used
λG = 0.3, λRegG = 0.5, λDx = 1 and λDxˆ = 0.01. The best epoch was chosen by determining the
one with minimal total loss for choosing G and the highest robustness against PGD (p =∞) on the
validation set for classifier models. Further details on hyperparameters specific to each dataset are
given in Table 3. The computer infrastructure employed included 11 Titan V, 6 Titan RTX, and 8
Titan V100 SMX2, and all GPUs were used interchangeably depending on availability. Some of the
experiments required large GPU memory capacity, which was available only on Titan RTX. Training,
combined with best epoch validation, took between 5 minutes and 17 hours for each run, depending
on the dataset, method, and GPU used. The average time for method and dataset are reported in
Table 3. Test evaluations for PGD attack took less than 20 minutes each. Table 3 also presents further
quantitative detail about the datasets used.
The COPD dataset was retrospectively gathered in the University of Utah Hospital, and the PFTs used
for labeling were acquired within 30 days of the CXR. Patients who have undergone lung transplant
and patients with several images in the same CXR study were excluded. Patients with an FEV1/FVC
lower than 0.7 [19] were assigned to class 1 as having COPD. Images were center-cropped, resized
to 256× 256, cropped to 224× 224 (randomly in training), and had their histograms equalized and
range adjusted to [−1, 1]. The dataset was split in training, validation, and test sets by patient ID,
since some patients were associated with more than one sample.
B Additional robustness graphs
In Figure 4, all attacks with a large enough bound were able to get 100% success, and increasing the
perturbation norm  increased attack success rate, signs that gradient does not suffer from intensive
gradient obfuscation [2] in any of the methods. For the Squares dataset, the alignment penalty training
method showed some gradient obfuscation for one of the classes, as seen in the bottom gap between
black-box attack and PGD attack in Figure 4, without largely reflecting on the numbers of Table 2.
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Figure 4: Accuracy of models as a function of perturbation norm after training using a plain supervised
training baseline (B), alignment penalty (Lα), and adversarial training with PGD (P) for 4 datasets:
Spheres (S), Squares (Q), MNIST-3/5 (M), COPD (C). We report results for 3 attacks: PGD [26]
restricted by the L∞ norm, the black-box Square Attack [1] (BlBox) restricted by the L∞ norm, and
PGD [26] restricted by the L2 norm. Models were selected randomly from the 5 trained models for
each training setup.
C Proofs
Lemma 1. Let l(x) = sup{r : ∀v s.t. ‖x− v‖2 < r, ∃!w,∃!b s.t. m(v) = σ(〈v, w〉+ b)}, i.e. l(x)
is the radius of the largest hypersphere around x where a decision model m can be defined by a
specific linear decision function. Assuming that l(x) ≥ |ρ(x)| for m, then the logits of m can be
modeled as a linear function, i.e, 〈x,w〉 + b, for robustness assessment, resulting in a robustness
magnitude in x given by |ρ(x)| =
∣∣∣ 〈x,w〉+b‖w‖2 ∣∣∣.
Lemma 1 is a direct consequence of Lemma 1 given in [8], where a proof is presented. We use the
term "locally linear around x" in Theorems 1 and 2 to refer to models that satisfy Lemma 1.
Theorem 1. Let sim(u, v) be the alignment between vectors u and v, defined by their cosine similarity
sim(u, v) = 〈u,v〉‖u‖2‖v‖2 , and let m be a binary decision model. For a pair of examples x0 and x1
from a binary dataset, of class 0 and 1, respectively, and around which m is locally linear, the
combined robustness ρ(x0) + ρ(x1) of m is directly proportional to α according to ρ(x0) + ρ(x1) =
‖x1 − x0‖2 ×α, where α = sim(x1 − x0,∇L(x0)) = sim(x0 − x1,∇L(x1)) and L(xi) is the binary
cross-entropy loss for example xi.
2
Proof. Since we assume local linearity, the model can be represented by m(x) = σ(〈x,w〉+ b) by
using Lemma 1. We also note that sim(w,∇L(x0)) = 1 and sim(w,∇L(x1)) = −1. The alignments
can be simplified as
α0 = sim(x1 − x0,∇L(x0)) = sim(x1 − x0, w), (13)
α1 = sim(x0 − x1,∇L(x1)) = −sim(x0 − x1, w) = α0 = α, (14)
α× ‖∆x‖2 =
〈x1, w〉 − 〈x0, w〉
‖w‖2
. (15)
If x is correctly classified, ρ(x) is equal to the distance between x and the decision boundary. In the
case of misclassification, we use the negative of the distance. We can use the equation of distance
between x and the hyperplane defined by 〈w, x〉+ b = 0 and the result from (15) to get
ρ(x0) = −〈x0, w〉+ b‖w‖2
, ρ(x1) =
〈x1, w〉+ b
‖w‖2
, (16)
ρ(x0) + ρ(x1) =
〈x1, w〉 − 〈x0, w〉
‖w‖2
= α× ‖∆x‖2 . (17)
Theorem 2. Assuming that, for a separable binary dataset, it is possible to define a bijection between
the support of both classes supp0 and supp1 such that, given all bijection pairs (x0, x1), x0 ∈ supp0
and x1 ∈ supp1,
1. P (x0) = P (x1),
2. a binary decision model m is locally linear around x0 and x1,
then the expected robustness of m, ρm, is related to the average alignment α between the model
gradient with respect to inputs and ∆x of pairs (x0, x1), according to
ρm ≥ inf(K)× α
2
and α ≥ 2× ρm
sup(K)
, (3)
where K is the set of distances ‖x1 − x0‖2 over all pairs (x0, x1).
Proof. The robustness of a model m can be written as
ρm =
∫
supp0
P (x)ρ(x) dx+
∫
supp1
P (x)ρ(x) dx. (18)
Since we can establish a bijection, we can integrate over both supports at the same time, pair by pair
of x0 and x1. Since P (x0) = P (x1), we can factor the probability, resulting in
ρm =
∫
supp0,supp1
P (x0)(ρ(x0) + ρ(x1)) dx. (19)
It is worth noting that sampling is balanced between the two classes since, from the established
bijection, ∫
supp0
P (x) dx =
∫
supp1
P (x) dx =
1
2
. (20)
Using Theorem 1 to substitute for ρ(x0) + ρ(x1) and using (20),
ρm =
∫
supp0,supp1
P (x0)α0 ‖x1 − x0‖2 dx ≥
inf(K)× α
2
, (21)
3
ρm =
∫
supp0,supp1
P (x0)α0 ‖x1 − x0‖2 dx ≤
sup(K)× α
2
, α ≥ 2× ρm
sup(K)
. (22)
4
